








The European Monetary Union (EMU) socialises
not only the good will and esteem that the nation-
al currencies have acquired but also the seignorage
profit which the central banks earn by lending
their money to the private sector at the market rate
of interest. Throughout their histories central
banks have accumulated interest-bearing assets
step by step with the expansion of their respective
monetary bases which has followed the growth of
the economies. These assets, which total EUR 352
billion in the euro-11 countries, are stocks of “his-
toric” seignorage wealth which will generate an
eternal, annual stream of returns that will help
finance government budgets. By 1 January 2002,
the seignorage wealth of participating countries
will be brought into, and socialised by, the curren-
cy union. The basic mechanism of this redistribu-
tion was noted in Remsperger (1996), and it was
studied extensively in Sinn and Feist (1997, 2000)
as well as in Gros (1998). Here, final calculation
results for the case of a Eurosystem containing
Greece are presented for the first time.
Country Size and Seignorage Wealth
It is not easy to understand why central bank
money is seignorage wealth, because accounting
practices blur the picture.The currency issued by a
central bank is listed on the liability side of its bal-
ance sheet, and the assets obtained in exchange for
the currency are listed on the asset side. From an
accounting perspective, money creation does not
generate wealth at a central bank because both
sides of the bank’s balance sheet grow simultane-
ously without generating any differential equity
capital.1
However, while the central bank does not pay inter-
est on the currency it issued, it collects interest on
the assets obtained in exchange. The return on the
assets backing the outstanding stock of currency is
seignorage profit, and these assets constitute
seignorage wealth. Seignorage wealth is net wealth
of the central bank because the stock of outstanding
currency will never have to be serviced with interest
or redemption payments. Under EMU, the socialisa-
tion of historic seignorage wealth accumulated in the
process of money creation over time will not occur
in a legal sense.Only the future interest income gen-
erated by this wealth will be pooled within the
Eurosystem, and the national central banks remain
the legal owners of the assets backing the monetary
base. However, from an economic point of view, the
eternal socialisation of an asset’s return is the same
as the socialisation of the asset itself. Thus, in eco-
nomic terms, there will indeed be a once and for all
socialisation of current central bank assets worth
EUR 352 billion in about a year from now.
The socialisation involves an effective net redistrib-
ution among the participating countries because the
interest income received by a country may differ
from what this country contributes. A country’s
share in the interest contribution to the pool
depends on its share in the joint currency. However,
the share in the interest which a country receives
from the pool depends on its share in the capital
contributed to the European Central Bank (ECB),
which in turn is given by the average of this coun-
try’s population and GDP shares.Apart from estab-
lishing a stake in the seignorage profit, a country’s
contribution to the ECB equity capital has little
more than a symbolic function. At just EUR 5 bil-
lion, the total capital endowment is tiny relative to
the EUR 352 billion stock of interest-bearing assets
contributed in the form of seignorage wealth.It does
not involve any resource cost for the contributing
countries because the interest it generates for the
ECB will be distributed in proportion to the capital
endowment.The share in the equity capital does not
really present a contribution, but rather the right to
participate in the profit distribution of the ECB.
Redistribution of Seignorage Wealth through EMU
If the capital keys happened to match the pre-euro
distribution of seignorage wealth across the
European countries, there would be no effective
redistribution of seignorage wealth. However, this
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is not the case. In fact, a unit of capital carries very
different amounts of seignorage wealth depending
on where it comes from. The implications for the
redistribution of seignorage wealth are sum-
marised in the table which refers to the situation of
1 January 1999.
Columns [1] and [2] show the absolute and relative
amounts of seignorage wealth contributed to the
pool,and columns [3] and [4] show the absolute and
relative amounts received from the pool. A com-
parison of columns [2] and [4] reveals that some
countries contribute more and receive less than
others. Germany, for example, contributes 39% and
receives 31% of seignorage wealth, whereas France
contributes 12% and receives 21%.
The most interesting information is contained in
columns [5] and [6]. They show the different coun-
tries’ absolute gains and losses and the respective
per capita amounts.Obviously,France is the big win-
ner and Germany the big loser of the redistribution
of seignorage wealth. While the French contribu-
tions amount to EUR 43.8 billion and the payments
received to EUR 74.6 billion, resulting in a gain of
EUR 30.9 billion, the German loss is EUR 30.0 bil-
lion. In per capita terms, the average French citizen
will gain EUR 527 or FF 3,460, and the average
German will lose EUR 366 or DEM 716.
Next to Germany, Spain loses most with EUR 11.3
billion in total which is EUR 287 or ESP 47,867 per
capita. Austria is the only fur-
ther loser with EUR 1.9 billion
in total and EUR 230 or ATS
3,158 per capita. The majority
of countries are winners: Por-
tugal, Finland, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Ireland, and Belgium, in the
order of their absolute gains.A
citizen of Luxembourg gains
most, with EUR 1,309 or BEF
52,811, followed by a Finn with
EUR 627 or FIM 3,726.
There are a number of reasons
for the imbalance between
country size and seignorage
wealth, and the resulting redis-
tribution. First of all, the
German figure is so high not
only because Germany is the
largest country, but also because the deutschmark
is an important international transactions and
reserve currency, taking second place only to the
dollar.2 The fall of the Iron Curtain, the traditional
strength of the German export industries, and the
conservative monetary policy of the Bundesbank
have all contributed to the dominant role of the
deutschmark. The high figures for the Spanish
seignorage wealth can partly be explained by the
importance of the Spanish overseas connections,
and partly by the large share of the Spanish shad-
ow economy,where cash rather than bank transfers
are used as a means of payment.3 The low share of
seignorage wealth contributed by France may be
attributed to the fact that the French franc is not
used much outside that country, and possibly also
to a well-developed banking sector and advanced
payment habits.
Understanding the Results
The figures refer to the wealth equivalents of the
redistribution of that part of the seignorage profit
which can be attributed to the assets that the cen-
tral banks had accumulated before 1 January 1999.
There are a few things to bear in mind for a prop-
er understanding of the results.
Winners and Losers from the Redistribution of Seignorage Wealth
Seignorage wealth Gain or loss
contributed received total per capita
EUR bn share % EUR bn share % EUR bn EUR
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Austria 12.3 3.4 10.5 2.9 – 1.9 – 230
Belgium 12.5 3.5 12.7 3.5 + 0.2 + 16
Finland 3.0 0.8 6.2 1.7 + 3.2 + 627
France 43.8 12.2 74.6 20.8 + 30.9 + 527
Germany 138.6 38.6 108.6 30.2 – 30.0 – 366
Greece 6.9 1.9 9.1 2.5 + 2.2 + 209
Ireland 3.4 1.0 3.8 1.0 + 0.3 + 91
Italy 64.5 18.0 66.0 18.4 + 1.5 + 26
Luxembourg 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.2 + 0.5 + 1 309
Netherlands 18.6 5.2 19.0 5.3 + 0.4 + 26
Portugal 4.6 1.3 8.5 2.4 + 3.9 + 396
Spain 50.7 14.1 39.4 11.0 – 11.3 – 287
Total 359.0 100.0 359.0 100.0 0.0 –
Note: Share of ECB capital as of 1 January 1999; monetary, exchange rate and popula-
tion data as of 31 December 1998. 
Sources: European Central Bank (1998): Key for the ECB’s Capital, Press Release. 1 De-
cember, Frankfurt; International Monetary Fund (2000): International Financial Statistics,
March. Washington. D.C., Statistisches Bundesamt (2000): Statistisches Jahrbuch für das
Ausland, Metzler-Poeschel: Stuttgart, p. 40.
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Firstly, the figures measure the once-and-for-all
redistribution effect and do not refer to annual
gains and losses. In principle, the annual gains and
losses can be calculated by multiplying the figures
given in column five of the table with a market rate
of interest, but since it is not clear what the future
rate will be, such a calculation would involve a
good deal of guesswork. A wealth-based calcula-
tion is free from such arbitrariness.We realise that
the Maastricht Treaty does not formally socialise
the assets backing the monetary base, but only
their interest, but we maintain that, from an eco-
nomic perspective, this is the same as a socialisa-
tion of the assets themselves.
Secondly, we equate seignorage wealth with a
country’s monetary base with the exception of
minimum reserves which private banks hold with
the ECB. As the ECB pays interest on these
reserves,they do not constitute a net wealth for the
ECB, and are therefore not included in our calcu-
lations. We neglect the role of coins, which repre-
sent a very small fraction of a country’s monetary
base, because we do not have a comprehensive
data set that would allow a comparison to be made.
The interest generated by assets backing the coins
is not subject to redistribution under the Maas-
tricht rules.
Thirdly, the figures do not include the present
value of future increments in seignorage wealth
which would have occurred in the course of a con-
tinued growth process,had the euro not been intro-
duced. They neither include the present value of
additional future increments in seignorage wealth,
if any, which might result from a particular attrac-
tiveness of the euro as an international transac-
tions and reserve currency.The proper distribution
of gains or losses through these increments is a dif-
ferent question not addressed here.The above cal-
culations relate to historic seignorage wealth only,
and raise the question of whether the countries
adopting the euro really wanted to effect the
gigantic redistribution of claims on existing assets.
How to Resolve the Problem
The redistribution of historic seignorage wealth is
implied, though not openly spelled out, by Article
32 of the Protocol No. 18 (ex No. 3) on the Statute
of the European System of Central Banks and of
the ECB of the Maastricht Treaty. It seems fair to
say that it was not understood and foreseen by the
parties signing the Treaty. Politicians realised what
they had signed only after the above-mentioned
studies were published. The reaction was to post-
pone the start of the redistribution process by three
years to clarify the matter, using transitional provi-
sions as specified in Article 32.3. Redistribution of
seignorage will only take place on a large scale from
1 January 2002 onwards, when the so-called “ear-
marking method,” which is reflected in the calcula-
tions presented here, will become effective.There is
no agreement yet on the exact and final provisions
concerning the redistribution process.4
Sinn and Feist (1997) as well as Gros (1998) suggest-
ed a grandfathering solution to the redistribution
problem. The essence of this solution is to allocate
the initial equity contributions in proportion to the
magnitudes of the respective monetary bases as of 1
January 1999 and the additional contributions neces-
sitated by the future growth in the joint monetary
base in proportion to country size. This suggestion
implies that historic seignorage wealth is exempt
from redistribution, but that the increments in
seignorage wealth due to the normal growth of the
European economies and due to any extraordinary
success of the euro are shared equally according to
country size. Such a rule would probably require an
amendment to the Maastricht Treaty. Given that the
redistribution clauses in the Treaty were probably
not understood by the signing parties, this amend-
ment should be agreeable to the member countries.
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